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INTERNATIONAL LAW-TREATIES-INCLUSION OF PURELY DOMESTIC MAT-
TERS IN RESERVATIONS-In consenting to the ratification of the treaty be-
tween the United States and Canada concerning uses of the waters of the 
Niagara River, the Senate attached a reservation which stated that "no 
project for redevelopment of the United States' share of such waters shall 
be undertaken until it be specifically authorized by Act of Congress."1 On 
1 Treaty Between the United States and Canada Concerning Uses of the Waters of the 
Niagara River, February 27, 1950, l U.S.T. 694 at 699. It is noteworthy that there was con-
siderable question in the legislative history of this treaty whether the subject of the reser-
vation was a proper one for inclusion in a treaty. Thus, the President in transmitting the 
treaty to the Senate pointed out that it "would not be appropriate either for this country 
or Canada to require that an international agreement between them contain the solution 
of what is entirely a domestic problem." 96 CONG. REc. 6128 (1950). The Foreign Relations 
Committee favorably reported the Treaty, subject to the reservation. 96 CONG. REc. 12094 
(1950). The Senate accepted the committee's recommendation and consented to the treaty 
1958] RECENT DECISIONS 457 
the basis of this reservation, the Federal Power Commission denied the 
application of the Power Authority of the State of New York for a license 
under the Federal Power Act2 covering the new flow of water made avail-
able under the treaty. On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit, held, order set aside and remanded. The subject 
covered by the reservation was purely domestic in nature and thus not 
proper for inclusion in a reservation. Not being a reservation, it was not 
part of the treaty and did not remove the new flow of water from the 
jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission. Power Authority of the 
State of New York v. Federal Power Commission, (D.C. Cir. 1957) 247 F. 
(2d) 538, revd. for mootness sub nom. American Public Power Assn. v. 
Powe,· Authority of the State of New York, (U.S. 1957) 78 S. Ct. 142. 
Although the issue in the instant case has meanwhile become moot,3 
the problem.of the relation between the treaty-makers and Congress is one 
of continued importance4 and warrants a critical -look at the disposition 
of the issue in the instant case. The provision inserted in the treaty was 
intended to be a "reservation" as its legislative history indicates.5 A reserva-
tion to a treaty is, by analogy to contract law, the refusal of an offer and 
the proffering of a counter-offer.6 If accepted by the other contracting state, 
the reservation becomes part of the treaty and "will, when in force, limit 
the effect of the treaty as between that State and the other party or parties 
to the treaty."7 On the basis of these definitions the court in the principal 
case held that the Senate's proviso did not constitute a reservation inas-
much as it did not change the effect of the treaty as to either party. The 
treaty became wholly executed on its effective date, i.e., each party became 
entitled to a particular quantum of water, it being of no concern to either 
party how the other proposed to make use of its share. In thus interpret-
ing the Senate's proviso as not constituting a reservation the court avoided 
the necessity of passing on the question of whether such a reservation, as 
part of the treaty, could be constitutional. As pointed out in the strong 
dissent of Judge Bastian,8 there can be no doubt that the Senate intended 
the proviso to be a reservation and part of the treaty, in that it conditioned 
with the reservation. 96 CONG. REc. 12095 (1950). In the protocol of the ratification, Canada 
inserted the statement on Oct. 10, 1950, that it would accept the reservation inasmuch as 
"its provisions relate only to the internal application of the treaty within the United. 
States and do not affect Canada's rights or obligations under the treaty." 
2 41 Stat. 1063 (1920), 16 U.S.C. (1952). §79Ia et seq. 
3 An act has 1been passed to authorize the construction of certain works of improve-
ment in the Niagara River for power and for other purposes, P. L. 85-159, 71 Stat. 401 
(1957), approved Aug. 21, 1957. 
4 See generally, Henkin, "The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Niagara· 
Reservation," 56 COL. L. REv. 1151 (1956); 51 ~M. J. INT. L. 606 at 610 (1957). 
li See note 1. 
6 l OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 8th ed., Lauterpacht, 914 (1955). 
129 AM. J. INT. L. SUPP. 843 at 857 (1935). 
s Principal case at 544. 
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its consent to the treaty on its acceptance.9 Yet in spite of the lack of author-
ity on the point, it would seem that the doctrine of separability of provi-
sions, employed in cases of unconstitutional legislation, is inapplicable in 
the case of an invalid reservation, inasmuch as a reservation is the Senate's 
way of conditioning its consent to the entire treaty. Striking down a reser-
vation would therefore seem to require striking down the entire treaty as 
well. In this context, then, the extent and nature of the treaty-making 
power become important. In his well-known discussion of this question 
in Missouri v. Holland,1° Justice Holmes questioned whether the extent 
of the treaty power might be limited by constitutional prohibitions apart 
from the formal requirements for its exercise. Without answering the 
question11 he sustained the treaty because it related to a "national interest 
of very nearly the first magnitude" which "can be protected only by nation-
al action in concert with that of another power."12 Previously it had been 
said that the treaty power extends to any matter which is properly the sub-
ject of negotiation with a foreign country,13 but we have recently been 
assured that it does not extend to matters "which do not essentially affect 
the actions of nations in relation to internationl affairs, but are purely 
internal."14 Nor would a treaty "abrogating the functions of the Supreme 
Court of the United States or of the legislative or executive bodies" be 
valid.15 'Whether such domestic matters can appropriately be included in 
a treaty by reservation becomes important because by this means previous 
bicameral congressional acts can be modified.16 It is no •longer doubted 
9 See note I supra. 
10 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
11 Justice Black gave an affirmative answer to Justice Holmes' question in Reid v. 
Covert, 354 U.S. I (1957). 
12 Note IO supra, at 435. 
13 Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. (7 U.S.) 199 (1796); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890). 
14 Secretary of State Dulles before a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
Hearings on S. J. Res. I, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 183, May 2, 1955. The Supreme Court, in 
Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30 at 40 (1931), held the treaty power broad enough to 
cover all subjects that properly pertain ,to foreign relations; to this the recent holding 
in United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955), should be applicable, viz., that 
a constitutional power granted for a special purpose cannot be used to make law on a 
matter unrelated to ,that purpose. If it were otherwise, there would be a situation, as 
Elihu Root put it, where "under pretense of exercising the treaty-making power, the 
president and the senate might attempt to make provisioi:is regarding matters ... which 
would be only a colorable-not a real-exercise of the treaty making power." Quoted in 
5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1943). For a fuller discussion of the law, 
reference should be made to the widely circulated Opinion by Prof. Philip C. Jessup 
(of counsel for the Power Authority of the State of New York in the instant case) and 
Prof. Oliver J. Lissitzyn, prepared for the Power Authority of the State of New York 
in 1955. 
15 Senator Kellogg, later Secretary of State, during the debate on the Treaty of 
Versailles, 58 CONG. REC. 3680 at 3685 (1919). 
16 E.g., in the instant case, the reservation would have served to supersede the Fed-
eral Power Act and to remove the administration of the new flow of water from the Feder-
al Power Commission. For a view upholding the Senate's power to thus affect prior domes-
tic legislation, see Henkin, "The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: T:he Niagara Reser-
vation," 56 CoL. L. REv. 1151 (1956). 
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that a treaty covering appropriate subject matter can "repeal" previous 
bicameral legislation.17 I£ the reservation in the principal case were held 
valid, however, it would allow the President and the Senate, by a purely 
domestic reservation, to modify existing domestic legislation,18 a process 
in which the House of Representatives must normally participate under 
our Constitution.19 The dissent in the principal case argued that this is ap-
propriate since the Senate could accomplish the same result-leaving the 
treaty water without the jurisdiction of the Commission-by rendering the 
treaty executory (non-self-executing)20 which it clearly has the power to 
do.21 While it is true in this case that the same result would follow-the 
treaty water would not be under the jurisdiction of the Commission-it 
seems incorrect to equate a reservation with the Senate's power to render a 
treaty non-self-executing. This difference is made clear by supposing a res-
ervation which authorized the construction of a power plant to utilize the 
water, a result which clearly could not be reached by leaving the treaty 
executory.22 Thus, while the interesting constitutional question remains 
unanswered, the court's failure to reach it in the principal case seems 
proper since the holding rested on the sound technical ground that the 
proviso was not a proper reservation.23 
Peter H. Hay, S.Ed. 
17 See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933). 
18 Compare the problem present when Congress passes an act providing that its 
provisions shall terminate on the passage of a joint resolution. This, in effect, is a method 
of repeal which by-passes the President's veto power. See Ginnane, "The Control of Fed-
eral Administration by Congressional Resolutions and Committees," 66 HARV. L. R.Ev. 
569 (1953), and Jackson, "A Presidential Legal Opinion," 66 HARV. L. REv. 1353 (1953). 
19 U.S. CoNsr., art. I, §1. "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representa-
tives!' 
20 A non-self-executing treaty is one which, although already a binding international 
obligation, is of such nature that it cannot "be given effect as law ex proj>rio vigore" 
domestically without further legislation. Secretary of State Hughes to Representative 
Porter, March 3, 1924, MS. Department of State, file 711.419/94, 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 177 (1943). 
21 See United States v. American Sugar Refining Co., 202 U.S. 563 (1906). 
22 It is interesting to consider the effect the holding may have on Senator Bricker's 
Senate Joint Resolution 3. [See 103 CoNG. REC. 259 (1957).] Section 2 of his resolution would 
give the Senate the power to prevent a self-executing treaty from superseding prior in-
consistent acts of Congress, and conversely, would give it power, by affirmative vote, ,to 
determine that the treaty shall have self-executing effect. See 51 AM. J. INT. L. 606 at 610 
(1957). It would seem that the decision in the principal case is evidence of the close 
scrutiny with which the judiciary will examine the exercise of the treaty making power 
by both the Senate and the President, thus eliminating much of the necessity for further 
safeguards. 
23 But see 71 HARv. L. REv. 368 (1957). 
